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Abstract  
In Madagascar, since 2005, more than fifty investors decided to invest in agriculture. More 
than one third abandoned due to political instability, lack of funding, absence of a solid 
business plan but also due to absence of transparency during negotiations of land access.  
Others go ahead discreetly.  
 
The Malagasy legal framework seems to be appropriate to regulate private investments: pro 
local rights land laws, investment law, compulsory environmental impact assessment, etc. 
However, the risks to local populations and to investors on the medium term are not 
associated to a lack of legislation but rather to lack of transparency and effective 
implementation and enforcement.  
  
The communication analyzes existing and potential tools that regulate land–related 
investments in Madagascar. In the light of international and local experiences, the different 
sections discuss the relevance and limits of measures that aim to: select the types of 
investments and investors transparently (part 1), secure local and investor land rights (part 
2), improve consultations (part 3), define and ensure compliance with investor’s commitments 
(part 4). The conclusion sets out, in the form of food for thoughts to enhance critical thinking, 
propositions of tools and interventions that promote transparency and regulate land access 
for investors.  
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Introduction 
 
In Madagascar, between 2005 and 2010, more than fifty large-scale land investment projects 
in the agricultural sector have been announced but one-third withdrew due to political 
instability and, above all, lack of a solid business plan (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2011). 
However, large-scale land appropriations continue and the promotion of investments is still on 
the political agenda. The new 2014 - 2025 Agricultural Policy1 (PSAEP) plans, in addition to 
improve the productivity of small-scale farmers, to allocate over 2 million hectares for 
agricultural and export-oriented private projects. 
 
In an emerging country such as Madagascar, it is a real challenge to reconcile on the one hand 
support to family farming with promotion of private investments and on the other hand, land 
as an inalienable heritage with land as simple merchandise. Yet, the legal framework enables 
state institutions to promote and regulate large-scale land deals. Since the 2005 reform, new 
land laws recognize local land rights and enable the decentralization of land management at 
the Commune level. Consequently, these laws require the State and its services to only lease 
or sell to investors land that is actually unoccupied or registered in the name of the state. At 
the same time, new rules and institutions that promote investments have been established: an 
Investment Law, a One-Stop service provider for investors, and a decree to mitigate 
environmental and social risks associated with investment projects. 
 
However, risks to local population, and to investors on the medium term, are not associated to 
a lack of legislation but rather to lack of transparence as well as lack of law’s implementation 
and enforcement (Teyssier et al., 2010; Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al., 2011). Indeed, 
various stakeholders, from state to local representatives ignore (more or less wilfully) these 
laws and the existing land rights in order to welcome the investment and consequently to 
attract resources in their territory or to capture rents (Burnod et al., 2013a&b). This is 
strikingly illustrated by the resulting land conflicts, some of which are regularly covered by 
the national and international mass media. 
 
In this context, what are, beyond the laws, the interventions that can regulate large-scale 
investments and promote transparency in Madagascar? The communication analyzes existing 
and potential regulatory tools in Madagascar in the light of international experiences. 
 
The communication is based on fifteen case studies on investment in agricultural sector in 
Madagascar, multi-country comparative analysis, as well as on a capitalization of the national 
and international experiences of the Observatory team, comprised of experts and researchers. 
 
The communication successively analyzes existing and potential regulatory tools in the 
Malagasy land-related context. It discusses the diverse type of interventions that aim to: select 
types of investments transparently (part 1), secure local and investor land rights (part 2), 
improve consultations (part 3), define and ensure compliance with investor’s commitments 
(part 4). Each section addresses relevance and limits of regulations’ tools in general and in 
Madagascar in particular. The conclusion sets out, in the form of food for thoughts to enhance 
critical thinking, propositions of regulatory interventions; and point out the range of actors 
and territorial levels that need to be involved in to ensure their implementation and 
effectiveness.   
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1 Screening of types of investments or investors  
1.1 Limited debates on business models   
The agricultural sector in the Southern countries requires investments to provide diversified 
crop production, create employment and ensure sustainable resource management. In 
Madagascar, neither agricultural policy nor land policies address frontally what business 
models have to be promoted (large-scale plantation, contract farming, joint venture, other). 
The default position is then to develop the coexistence of different forms of agricultural 
investments. 
1.2 Existing tools for promoting and guiding investments  
The Economic Development Board of Madagascar (EDBM), created in 2006, plays the 
role of a One-Stop service provider for foreign investors. It promotes investments rather than 
regulating them (no selection of investors, weak capacity to control). Moreover, it struggles to 
assume its duties - due to lack of funding during the national political crisis [2009-until now] - 
and to be the sole entry point for investors (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al., 2011). 
 
The Investment law (No. 2007-036) leads to a substantial change compared to previous laws 
by authorizing and facilitating access to land property for foreign investors. It removes the 
three obligations previously required to investors (Pasquier et al., 2008): investing more than 
USD 500,000; respecting accurate investment and expenses plans; applying for a lease to the 
Prime Minister. Investors have only to register their company or subsidiary in Madagascar, 
realize a business plan and request an authorization of land acquisition to the EDBM. 
Afterwards, they have to apply to the land administration and follow the regular procedures 
for obtaining a land title. Once they become landowner, they can manage and even sell their 
land property2.  
 
In fact, the implementation of that investment law is limited, in the absence of any 
implementing decree and due to the land administration’s reluctance to let the EDBM 
intervene  in controlling land access (Burnod et al., 2013 a). Thus, the unique legal way for 
foreigners to access to land is to contract a land lease with a private person/company or with 
the Malagasy State, and in the latter case, the land administration has the sole responsibility 
for managing the process.  
 
Moreover, in 2011, the Ministry in charge of land issues issued a new circular designed to 
regulate the procedure for large-scale land acquisitions (more than 2,500 ha)3, opposing the 
investment law. Implicitly excluding access to private land property, the circular authorizes 
access to large areas of land only through a 50 or 99-year lease for both native and foreigners 
(in practice, lease duration is reduced to 30 years). It requires investors to obtain an official 
approbation before engaging in procedures to access land and to get an “authorization to 
prospect land” (by the Minister in charge of land issues for projects above 250 ha, by an 
interministerial commission for those above 2 500 ha and eventually the Council of 
Ministers). Despite a land reform in favor of decentralization, this new process gives evidence 
of the State’s will, to recentralize control over these land deals, to recall the authority of the 
                                                 
2
 However, land speculation is unauthorized. Besides, foreign potential buyers should get an authorization from 
EDBM 
3
 Circular No. 321-10/MATD/SG/DGSF : « Instructions concernant la procédure à suivre en matière de demande 
de terrain de grande superficie », 10/25/2011” 
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central administration to regional as well as local leaders 4 and others institutions, and to 
exercise a tighter control on the financial resources associated to land deals – official rents 
and bribes (Burnod et al., 2011b & 2013b). The fact that an interministerial commission is 
involved in this process prevents the Minister in charge of land issue from monopolizing the 
power (at least apparently) and offers it the opportunity to share the risk in case of social 
protests5.  
1.3 Absence of incentives promoting responsible investments  
The Malagasy land policies do not attempt to make large-scale plantations less attractive. The 
tenfold increase in land rent in 2011 (from 1 to USD 10/ha) was realized to increase State’s 
rents rather than restricting large-scale plantations. Unlike Argentina6 (Vorley et al., 2012), 
the Malagasy State does not put any upper limit to land allocation. Likewise, the choice to 
increase gradually the leased land areas, subject to compliance with the contract 
specifications, results more from the pressure applied to certain investors than from a new 
policy setting limits on the allocated areas.  
1.4 Selection of investors  
The selection of investors can occur first at the international level on the basis of international 
financial institutions policies, and then, at the national level, according to the host country’s 
policies.  
1.4.1 At international level: loan conditionality  
Some financial institutions (Equator Principles Financial Institutions - EPFIs) have adopted 
the Equator Principles (EP). Then, they have to fund or guarantee only projects (notably the 
ones above USD 10 million) that are developed in a socially and environmentally responsible 
manner. Covering over 70 % of international project loans in emerging markets, the EPFIs 
can play a leverage effect in terms of social and environmental issues (Acosta, 2013). 
However, these Principles face various limits. To remain competitive, some EPFIs continue to 
fund unsustainable projects (Balch, 2013; Wörsdörfer, 2013). Because those principles are 
non-binding (op cit.), neither borrowers nor lenders are accountable towards affected 
community in case of non-respect of the EP. Finally, on the pretext of banking secrecy, 
almost none information proving that the projects actually respect the EP is published.   
  
Projects funded according to EP are assessed following IFC’s criteria7; the fifth one referring 
to land issues. But the formulation of this latter is too generic. For example, the French 
Development Agency (AFD) and Proparco (AFD’s subsidiary dedicated to private sector) 
interpret it as an obligation to respect local land rights (even if they are not formalized 
through land titles), to consult customary authorities, to avoid displacement of people and, 
otherwise, to implement compensation measures. These principles, constructive to foster 
responsible investments, are quite limited in practice with respect to land. Ex ante, bankers do 
not systematically have the relevant expertise on the local land issues and the project’s land 
effects during due diligence process, in order to adjust consequently the disbursement of 
                                                 
4
 Some Head of Administrative Region allocated land to investors via informal Agricultural Investment Zones 
(cf. infra) 
5
 In 20009, the Ministry in charge of land issues, who started negotiation with the multinational Daewoo for 
allocating it thousands of hectares, exiled himself when the case was revealed and contributed to the fall of the 
Ravalomanana’s government. 
6
 Maximum limit of 1,000 ha in districts with high agricultural production  
7
 Part of the World Bank group, dedicated to private sector 
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funds. Because of EPFI’s specific concerns, the potential negative impacts on local land rights 
rarely justifies a loan rejection and, paradoxically, the bank can strengthen these negative 
effects by requiring a proof of a legal land access. Without ex ante intervention, land conflicts 
can emerge ex post. Then, the EPFI can rely on their sole available legal instrument: the 
action plan associated with the contract, if this latter is specific on land issues, to put pressure 
on the investor and threaten him not to realize expected disbursements (eg Conchou, 2013; 
Mignot, 2013).  
 
In Madagascar, two mining companies (excluding EPFI) declare to respect the Equator 
Principles, but only one of them releases information to prove it. Displacements of 
communities have not been avoided but various compensations have been granted8.  
1.4.2 At national level: a weak selection   
Currently, there is no real screening of investors, and in that event, the selection criteria are 
not transparent. In the same way as in many African countries (Vorley et al. 2012), the one-
stop office for investors (EDBM) does not carry out any selection (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana 
et al., 2011). Likewise, the inter-ministerial committee (cf. supra) have never definitively 
refused authorizations to prospect land to investors. And yet, a minimum selection seems to 
be important to avoid allocating land to investors without any means or expertise in 
agriculture. In Madagascar, a control is realized on the fifth year of the lease contract to check 
the effective cultivation of the land and to confirm its 30 years (or more) length. However, 
this control is realized once the land is registered in the name of the State. If this registration, 
which is funded by the investor, represents a significant profit for Malagasy State, it 
represents a strong legal loss for former local land users and owners. This is similar to 
Mozambique, the control performed after 2 years, allows the investor to obtain a permanent 
right to use land or the State to recover the land and hand over to another investor (Hanlon, 
2011).  
2 Secure local people as well as investors’ land rights  
2.1 An innovative but insufficiently implemented national legislation  
In many African countries, customary lands are legally protected. Legal formalization of 
occupancy (individual land certificate in Ethiopia, or a DUAT for one community in 
Mozambique) may offer a first legal protection but covers in general a small part of the 
territory (Hanlon, 2011; Lavers, 2012). Moreover these legal protections do not prevent the 
land deals. The local communities, legally recognized as owners, can directly deal with 
investors (e.g. Ghana, Schoneveld & German, 2013). Besides, when the State needs land, it 
can define community-owned lands as State-owned land or make sure to reclassify them 
(Alden Wily, 2011, e.g. Tanzania, German et al., 2013).  
 
In Madagascar, the land reform legally recognizes the local land rights and implements the 
decentralization of land competences. These new land laws establish that untitled but 
occupied land is no longer the property of the state but ‘untitled private property’ (Propriétés 
Privées Non Titrées, PPNT)9. On these PPNT, the Commune and especially its local land 
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 Monetary compensation, support to income-generating activities, resettlement and securing resettled 
households with granting them land titles (Ambatovy, 2012) 
9
 Law No. 2006-031 
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office (Guichet Foncier, GF) can recognize and formalize local/customary land rights (if 
these latter are already acquired and socially recognized) and issue land certificates. 
 
Consequence of this land reform, the land that the State land services can lease or sell to 
investors has been drastically reduced. It now amounts to land titled in the name of the State 
and un-titled and unoccupied land10. The State can neither lease nor sell land that includes or 
encroaches upon titled private property or upon occupied land (PPNT), whether or not 
formalized by a certificate.   
But, in practice, the new land laws are insufficiently implemented and enforced (Andrianirina 
Ratsialonana et al., 2011; Burnod et al., 2013a&c; Franchi et al., 2013): 
• The mere legal status of PPNT, even without GF or land certificate, is supposed to 
offer a first legal protection to individuals and communities. In practice, PPNT is recognized 
and respected only when the land administration decides to do it or when a certificate 
effectively materializes it. Besides, one third of the communes have a local land office and in 
these latter, only 9% of households hold a certificate (Burnod et al., 2013c);  
• pastoralist rights on pastures are not protected (cf. infra); 
• both land administration services and local leaders ignored (more or less wilfully) 
these laws and still conceive untitled land as stated-owned. Above all, they want to see the 
project develop, to get some rents for their territory (communes, Regions, etc.) and, 
sometimes, to extract some unofficial rents. (Burnod et al., 2013b); 
• according to the law11, expropriation or eviction are only possible when the State 
considered it to be in the public interest. In practice, the Malagasy State have already used this 
procedure for private interest, such was the case for multinational mining companies; 
• consultations of local communities are compulsory in the land procedures but they are 
very often done in a rush so that rights holders find themselves dispossessed of their lands, 
leading to more or less violent oppositions (Burnod et al., 2013a); 
• although the law specifying the compensation modalities is not updated regarding the 
new legal provision on PPNT, it prescribes compensation for all rights, whether or not they 
are legally registered. In practice, compensations are provided only for huge economic 
projects (large mining projects) and when donors and international media put pressure on the 
company and the State. On the one hand, compensations are paid only for some land rights 
and very often, those giving rise to a visible occupation (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana & 
Burnod, 2012). On the other hand, notably for informal land rights, compensations cover only 
a partial value of occupation (e.g. building value or food crops on the land) (op cit).  
 
Land tenure security is acquired if socially legitimate institutions ensure it. Without consent 
of local community, investors' use rights sanctioned by law and State institutions are 
insufficient to stabilize property relations and confer secure land rights for investors. As 
observed in some regions of the island (Medernach & Burnod, 2013), investors may see their 
building and agricultural achievements damaged or burnt. However, their lease contract can 
protect them against eventual opportunistic expropriation fomented by some public decision-
makers, via appealing to national justice system (if it is unbiased) or to institutions in charge 
of dispute settlement mentioned in bilateral investment protection agreements (cf. infra).  
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2.1.1 Soft laws 
Madagascar’s national legal provisions are more stringent and concrete on land issues than 
most of international soft laws. Indeed, in most cases, soft laws are generic and focus more on 
local people and indigenous rights in general; employees’ rights and due diligence to manage 
investment risks than on land rights12. However, further to large media coverage of 
controversies related to large-scale land acquisitions, several specific soft laws have been 
developed (Margulis et al., 2013):  
•  «Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests » unanimously approved by the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) in 
2012; 
• «principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment » (RAI), whose inclusive 
consultation is in process;  
• «a set of minimum principles and measures to address the human rights challenge», 
relative to large-scale land acquisitions and leases drafted in 2009 by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food; 
• « framework and guidelines on Land Policy in Africa », adopted by African Heads of 
State and Government in 2009. 
 
These initiatives create only moral or political commitment. As non-binding instrument, they 
are voluntarily implemented and rely on investors and states’ goodwill for complying with the 
principles (Banchand & Veilleux, 2001). They are therefore controversial. On the one hand, 
soft laws are considered as inefficient in context where the national legal framework is not 
even enforced (Djiré & Wambo, 2011; Plançon, 2012). On the other hand, they are 
recognized as useful since they address shortcomings of national legislation and used as 
references for States, donors, civil society and investors (Arial et al., 2012; Blank, 2013).  
 
While specific soft laws on land issues recognize and protect pastoralists’ land rights, in 
Madagascar these rights are not legally protected13. And yet, extensive grazing land areas are 
often coveted by investors and source of conflicts (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al., 2011; 
Medernach & Burnod, 2013). Although these soft laws are not very present in the Malagasy 
debate at the national level; they could be mobilized for improving national laws.   
2.1.2 Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA)  
Madagascar has signed IPPAs with several countries in order to provide to foreign investors 
equitable treatment, full protection and security of their investments. Expropriation can be 
done only for public purposes, under due process of law, on a non discriminatory basis and 
provides adequate compensation. Malagasy State must also compensate for losses in case of 
revolution or riots (but not in the case of conflicts between investors and local communities). 
Disputes are subject to the national justice, an arbitration body, or even the arbitration of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (WTO, sd). These IPPAs, 
which are binding and in this sense very different from soft laws, underline that protection is 
stronger for investors than for local people (Cotula, 2012).  
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 The few that address concern about land issues are: «Children’s rights and business principles» and the « UN 
Declaration of indigenous rights». They call for respect and protect community land rights and free, prior and 
informed consent to the approval of any investment project  
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2.1.3 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) instruments  
An array of self-regulation tools for businesses has been developed by non-state actors in the 
framework of CSR14. Companies may have an interest in adopting them to avoid conflicts and 
stakeholders’15 pressure; to reduce negative financial and reputational effects and to secure 
their investments (Arnal & Lemière, 2006; Cuffaro & Hallam, 2011). Within a context of 
growing critics and opposition against business practices, several tools aiming at enhancing 
some “good practices” have rapidly multiplied, such as labels, norms and standards or ethical 
stock indexes. These tools certify that a company respects several socio-environmental 
criteria (Arnal & Lemière, 2006; Robert-Demontrond & Joyau, 2009). Two of the more well-
known tools are the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) for managing forest responsibly and 
the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) norm promoting the growth and use of 
sustainable palm oil. They both appeal to respect the local land rights16. Other tools such as 
ethical indexes, set up by extra-financial rating agencies and stock exchanges, do not 
incorporate precise criteria on land issues but mention broadly the importance to respect of 
local population rights, the amount to invest in social projects or the interest in doing social 
reporting. 
 
These tools have drawbacks that limit their efficiency. As their implementing cost are high, 
only few legal companies can afford it and other companies, that may be respectful of social 
and environmental issues, tend to be pushed aside. Besides, assessment methodologies are 
heterogeneous and the criteria are not specific enough. Moreover, the latter are very often 
badly assessed due to lack of auditor’s expertise in complex land issues or inadequate 
consultation of local communities (Arnal & Lemière, 2006; Pagès, 2006; De Man, 2012). 
Thus, the assessments rarely mention or suggest solutions to land conflicts (op. cit.). In 
Madagascar, no recent entrepreneur is involved in this type of approach, except transnational 
companies that do not publish any specific report to prove that their Malagasy subsidiaries 
really follow the established principles.  
 
Ultimately, beyond this multiplicity of tools and the vague criteria on land issues, these tools 
only apply once investors have developed their project. However, critical period takes place 
before investors start improving and working the land. 
 
2.2 Land identification for investors 
A key step in securing land for local people and investors is the identification of lands for 
investments.  
Some countries establish land banks (Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana – German et al., 2011&2013), 
in addition to others tools designed and recommended by international donors to attract 
investors (Daniel & Mittal, 2010). Lots of experiences were unsuccessful (op. cit; Vorley et 
al., 2012; Lavers, 2012) but have underlined that their relevance and working depend on:  
• the institution that identifies land (government, district and region in Tanzania, 
province in Ethiopia, traditional authorities in Zambia - German et al., 2013; Lavers, 2012). 
However, some land was classified as « unused » and gathered in these banks without any 
local consultation. To avoid such top-down identification without negotiation, some initiatives 
                                                 
14
 No State regulation in these mechanisms 
15
 Stakeholders include shareholders, employees, consumers, civil society, etc. 
16
 Besides, RSPO imposes transparency on negotiations related to compensation of communities’ rights losses 
(legal or customary rights); free, prior and informed consent of local population during investor’s land 
acquisition. 
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in Senegal or in Mozambique promote the idea that local communities are the ones who have 
to identify the land and to reach a consensus between the different parties: land users, 
landowners and also those in charge of land management. The idea is also that, in case of non-
use, these land would be reallocated to the original owners, but this is rarely the case (German 
et al., 2013); 
• the institution that manage these land banks. In Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana and Ethiopia 
these banks are managed by investment agencies (or one-stop office). These institutions may 
have a weak expertise in land issues, see their role disputed by other authorities in charge of 
land issues and are ultimately more a source of information to identify land than real 
managers (Vorley et al., 2012); 
• the type of identified land. In Tanzania, 2.5 million hectares have been selected but 
they were fragmented or located in unattractive zones. Finally, only 2% have been allocated 
to investors (Vorley et al., 2012). In Ethiopia, the State offers benefits to investors who decide 
to operate in the most remote areas (tax exemption) but these land may be common grazing 
lands (Lavers, 2012). 
 
To avoid these difficulties and keep a logical of upstream land identification, development 
territorial plans17 can delimit investment areas that are consistent with other socio-economic 
activities and not restricted to some plots; investors having different requirements depending 
on their project (agriculture, cattle breeding, mining, etc.). These plans have the advantage to 
raise the negotiation between different actors of the territory and do not involve an 
irreversible mapping of activities to conduct (experiences in Senegal and Niger). In Tanzania, 
use of development plans at local level is strongly recommended under the « biofuel 
recommendations». However, it’s not specified who has to finance these plans. The risk is 
that the company interested in land appropriation will finance it ex post and turn it to his 
advantage (Vorley et al., 2012).  
 
In Madagascar, setting up such land banks has been considered under Ravalomanana’s regime 
(2003-2009). Informally, Heads of Regions had to identify Agricultural Investment Zones 
(ZIA). Some investors established their project on this type of land but they had to leave or 
start again procedures to access to land because the ZIA do not have any legal existence. 
More recently, a new structure in charge of a land bank is also suggested under Act II of the 
land reform (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana & Legendre - coord., 2011) (cf. infra). 
3 Local consultations 
 
In Madagascar, the procedure to access land and the obligation to realize social and 
environmental impact assessment (EIA, cf. infra), legally require at least two local 
consultations:  
• when investors prospect land. They have to request local authorities and neighbors’ 
approval, while the local population is, at best, informed. Minutes of community consultation 
reveal a limited number of participants and rarely record any protest (Andrianirina – 
Ratsialonana et al., 2011, Burnod et al, 2013a); 
• when experts conduct the EIA. Public hearings focus more on the desired counterparts 
than their choice to welcome or not the investment;  
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In parallel, investors generally lead awareness campaigns and consultations. However, urged 
on by time and bankers, and guided by intermediaries or decision-makers favorable to the 
project, the investors and their team do not systematically have proficiency and resources to 
consult all the villages and, above all, all the landowners and land users (Burnod et al, 2013b; 
Medernach & Burnod, 2013). 
 
During these consultations, required by law or realized under investors’ initiative: information 
on the project is incomplete (sometimes due to lack of the project’s completion); 
representation of all land rights holders is not wide enough; discussions are more about 
promises relative to jobs and infrastructures than about potential negative impacts; and local 
farmers are generally embarrassed to speak in front of investors, political or administrative 
representatives. Besides, the land areas targeted for acquisition are often presented as 
belonging to the State – even if it is not the case. This provides little room for maneuver for 
the local communities who already have low bargaining capacity.  
 
In conclusion, local communities’ opinion is required more on the nature of the counterparts 
and the localization of the land areas allocated to the project than on their acceptance or 
refusal of the company. Protests and refusals generally emerge later on when local population 
becomes aware of the effective gains and losses (Evers et al., 2011; Schoneveld & German, 
2013). 
4 Commitments and measures to push compliance  
4.1 Definition  
On their own initiative, constrained by law or at local population’s request, investors 
undertake to give compensation in return for land and natural resources access. These various 
commitments are discussed below.  
4.1.1 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
In line with an environmental decree18, all agricultural investments exceeding an area of 1,000 
hectares need to realize an EIA, integrating socio-economical and environmental issues. 
Subject to a positive evaluation of the EIA, the National Office for Environment (ONE) 
delivers an environmental permit combined with an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) 
and must enforce this requirements’ document.   
Implementation of this decree encounters various difficulties (Andrianirina Ratsialonana et 
al., 2011), similar to lots of African countries (Vermeulen & Cotula, 2010; German et al., 
2013): 
• consultation processes are weak; 
• the quality of the EAI is questionable in the absence of any validation done by a 
certified organism; 
• the EMP, as well as EIA, is hardly ever publicized. Moreover, social and economic 
investor’s commitments are vague. Specifications about nature, quantity and timing of the 
required services and infrastructures are missing. Thus, monitoring and enforcement of these 
requirements are all the more tricky;   
                                                 
18
 Decree to Make Investments Compatible with the Environment (MECIE decree, No 99-954, modified by 
Decree No 2004-167) 
  
12 
 
• lack of resources of the institutions – such as ONE and its regional sub-branches or the 
environmental units of all concerned Ministries, limits the reliability of the EMP and its 
enforcement. For example, the economic viability or the harmonization of the project with the 
recent land laws are not seriously assessed;  
• the procedure to access to large-scale land areas requires only a receipt proving that 
the investor initiated an application for an environmental permit but not the environmental 
permit itself;  
• some companies start and realize their investment without any environmental permit.    
4.1.2 The land lease contract  
The land lease contract is also combined with a requirements’ document. This latter, identical 
for all investors, does not really specify the actions to undertake. It specifies that the non-
payment of the land rent or the non-respect of the authorized use of land can breach the 
contract. But, beyond these specifications, it only mentions to maintain good neighborly 
relations, to engage socio-economic compensations for the local communities and to accept, 
in this respect, the monitoring of the regional authorities. Moreover, requirements’ document 
is not articulated with the EMP. Finally, in practice, it is only used to pressure the investors to 
get new official or unofficial compensations.  
4.1.3 Local agreements  
During negotiation, investors and respectively Region, municipalities, villages’ 
Representatives can reach agreements. These latter can only be verbal or formalized under 
very different ways (a document signed by the parties, or even stamped by an administration, 
etc.). Their legal value is often weak or non-existent. Moreover, these commitments, in 
addition to be varied and sometimes unrealistic, are vague. Then, those agreements are not 
efficient, neither for the local actors who enjoy in the best case only some advantages, nor for 
the investor who runs the risk of seeing the requests increasing.  
4.1.4 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
The tools promoting companies’ reputation (code of conduct, social reporting, norms and 
labels), inappropriate to evaluate if the local land rights are respected (cf. supra), are more 
accurate to monitor the company’s socio-economic and environmental commitments.  
 
Since the States struggle to actually regulate the investments and since their sanctions are 
weak, non-existent or arbitrary, media and the civil society’s pressures (through negative 
advertising, strikes, etc.) give credibility to the CSR tools and incite the companies to respect 
them, even if those CSR tools are implemented first for marketing concerns (Arnal & 
Lemière, 2006; Robert-Detromond & Joyau, 2009).  
 
In Madagascar, few companies are familiar with CSR concept and they mainly match it to 
ways to improve working conditions, respect environment and promote themselves (Ernst & 
Young and UNICEF, 2011).  
 
4.2 Commitments’ monitoring  
Nowadays, the capacities and resources of the (para) governmental institutions (EDBM; 
ONE; land, forest or mining State services) are scarce to monitor investors’ commitments. 
Besides, they rarely impose sanction to companies that are not compliant with any 
requirements’ documents.  
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Companies can, at their own initiative, be transparent to prove that they respect their 
commitments. This can be done through social reporting, of which the world reference is the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Fogelberg, 2011). But this tool shows off several limits: it 
remains perceived as a communication tool; it mentions neither the respect of rights of the 
indigenous people nor the land issues; the reports, never detailed at the country level for 
transnational companies, are not checked by independent experts. In Madagascar, social 
reporting is little practiced19.  
Other multi-stakeholders initiatives can promote transparency on investors’ commitments, 
such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). This latter brings together, on 
a voluntary basis, government, companies and civil society to make sure that the State and the 
decentralized entities let some independent experts check and publish: the contracts they 
signed, the way they allocate them and the taxes they perceive from the companies.  
 
In Madagascar20, the EITI national committee puts in the annual EITI report all the companies 
paying more than USD 100,000 of taxes. But this tool displays several limits: contrary to the 
Liberia case (Cotula, 2014), the contracts are not published; the annual report does not 
analyze or make transparent local conflicts or the way companies access to land21. In addition, 
the participation of the civil society is crucial but this latter, member of EITI Madagascar, 
engages itself in few advocacy actions in general and about land issues in particular.  
 
Watchdog organizations (such as Observatory) and research centers have an important role in 
promoting transparency and debate on land issues and on investors’ inputs and abuses (Djiré 
and Wambo, 2011; Arial et al., 2012). The Malagasy organization, the Land Observatory, was 
created in 2007 to conduct researches on land issues, to enhance the public debate and to 
support the design and the implementation of the land policy. However, the Land Observatory 
is sometimes confronted with a lack of reactivity of its various partners, subject to the 
guidance of the Ministry in charge of land issues to which it is linked, and subject to an 
endless search for funding (as the government, private sector or the civil society do not 
finance it as it can be the case in other countries).  
 
The civil society is present and active on land issues but it is relatively recent. It can be a key 
element to enforce the respect of local land rights and, more largely, the companies’ 
commitments. The most active organizations are Solidarité des Intervenants sur le Foncier22 
(SIF), HAFARI Malagasy or Collectif pour la défense des terres malgaches23. Due to the 
passive and resigned public opinion, the threat of reprisal and limited means, their advocacy 
actions remain discreet.  
 
Otherwise, the national media plays a minor role in the regulation of investment. Information 
is far from being objective for two main reasons. First, media are not totally free due to a 
strong politicization of the newspapers, radio and TV channels, and the recurrence of threats 
restricting the freedom of expression. Also, for almost all articles or documentaries, the 
                                                 
19
 One third of the 1070 interviewed companies – all types of sector – publish information on their 
environmental and social practices but, most of the time, in a very succinct way (Ernst & Young and UNICEF, 
2011) 
20
 The application, accepted in 2008, is not yet validated due to the last political crisis 
21
 The Malagasy mining code (decree n°2006-910) oblige holders of mining license to respect the land rights 
holders 
22
 Solidarity amongst actors intervening in the land sector 
23
 Collective for the protection of the Malagasy land: based in France, it develops connection with international 
actors 
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journalists are paid by the companies or the civil society organizations, and information is 
published without any critical analysis.  
 
Finally, reporting companies’ misconducts at the national level has an impact only if the 
international level echoes it, as it was the case for the company Daewoo Logistics24. The 
media buzz spread first at the international level before reverberating at the national level. The 
network of civil society organizations working on land issues voiced their doubts and fears; 
the political opposition forces seized upon this sensitive issue to maintain and increase the 
mobilization of the masses during the 2009 protests; and the information was progressively 
spread from towns to countryside and lastly to affected people (Allaverdian, 2010). However, 
it seems to be difficult to systematically involve the international level for each advocacy 
action.  
5 Discussions and policy proposals  
 
- Open an enlarged debate on agricultural development and the role of large-scale land 
based investments; 
- Within the framework of agricultural policy, decide on the priority given to the large-
scale farms or, on the contrary, to more inclusive agricultural business models and, 
consequently, decide the suitable incentives (tax level, priority access, etc.);   
- Inform and involve decision-makers in the debate and especially in the decision about: 
investment upper limits (land area or invested amount) beyond which the council of Ministers 
or the Parliament’s approval is requested;  
- Rework the modalities to identify, select and negotiate the land allocated to the investors 
(cf. infra); 
- Debate on the maximum land area that can be allocated to investors, and favor 
progressive allocation conditioned on the respect of socio-environmental obligations; 
- Rethink the level of land rents and land lease length, or even formalize the ongoing 
practice that allocates land for a 30 years period;  
 
- Select the investors according to the quality of their project. At the local level, the local 
actors should realize their own selection according to what they want for their territory. At the 
national level, the existing ‘pre-selection’ could be reinforced through the following actions: 
• add to the existing committee some representatives from para-governmental agencies 
(such as EDBM) and discuss the possibility to rely on qualified experts in order to 
assess the project specificity (and to avoid, for example, admitting agricultural 
investment based on unrealistic agronomical hypothesis); 
• define and publish the list of selection criteria. In Perou, allocations of some State-
owned land are based on public auction (Deininger et al., 2011). The selection is then 
explicitly done based on financial capacity (the highest bidder) but not necessarily on 
criteria favouring the respect of the socio-environmental issues. An option could be 
                                                 
24
 In November 2008, the Financial Times (Blas, 2008) broke the story that secret negotiations were taking place 
between the Malagasy government and the South Korean company to produce palm oil and corn for export on 
1,300,000 hectares of populated areas 
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setting up a selection that prioritizes: a) investors engaged in norms and labels, 
experimented in CSR practices or/and funded according to Equator principles, b) 
agricultural investments that meet the objectives of the rural development policies and 
c) projects that plan ahead inclusive business models; 
• publish the list of the selected investors;    
- Respect the land rights by engaging the following actions (Burnod et al., 2011a): 
• complete the land laws in order to protect the cattle breeders’ rights; 
• strengthen the on-going land reform by consolidating and multiplying the land 
local offices. Indeed, the land local office has 4 main functions. It offers to local 
population legal empowerment to defend and to have their land rights recognized. It 
strengthens the role of commune in land management. It supplies maps that could ease 
identification of the land targeted by the investor, of the land use competition, or even, 
the potential linkages between economic activities (agriculture, cattle breeding, wood 
harvesting). Lastly, the land local office represents a first authority to resolve conflicts; 
• better inform the local populations as well as the investors on the new land laws 
and procedures;  
• publish at the local level the ‘authorizations of land prospection’; 
• improve and enlarge local consultations (cf. infra); 
• inform widely on the scheduled date for the realization of the field visits aiming at 
identifying the land that is intended for investment; 
• open the land commission organized by the land administration to an enlarged 
number of actors: representatives chosen by villagers, land local officer agents, 
external expert watching over that the process goes smoothly. Disseminate the results 
of this commission to allow, the absents and excluded persons, opposing the 
delimitation; 
• where necessary, debate on expropriation conditions of all affected land owners and 
land users, as well as on the procedure of compensation. Transparency on 
compensation should reign to avoid elites capturing or embezzling them; 
- Identify the land areas: before investors come or on demand? 
• discuss on the relevance of a para-governmental agency in charge of a land bank 
(cf. Andrianirina-Ratsialonana & Legendre - coord., 2011) while taking in account the 
lessons from other countries. This agency could: a) make an inventory of the State-owned 
land (because until today no such inventory exists); b) decide on their allocation: 
productive investment, public housing, reallocation to occupants, etc.; c) fix the rent fees 
or the sale price. The idea would be more to highlight the existing State-owned land than 
to delimit new ones. However, questions remain about the number of such land areas, the 
effective absence of land users and, above all, the capacity of this type of agency to 
manage the land from the capital city;  
• or, in an alternative or complementary way, discuss on the relevance of the 
creation of ‘municipality-owned lands’. Under a process of reinforced decentralization, 
it could be relevant to transfer from the State to the municipalities the management of 
State’s non-appropriated land areas (if they exist). A communal land use management 
plan is especially relevant in that case; 
- Improve the consultations through: 
• the specification of the modalities, notably for the consultations imposed by law. In 
Mozambique, the land laws define the number of compulsory public hearings as well 
as the number of men and women from each community that must attend the 
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consultation and sign the minutes; while in Tanzania, the local chiefs have to disclose 
and discuss on the project with all the village assembly (German et al. 2013). The idea 
is to avoid consulting only the local authorities (from mayor to customary chiefs) that 
extend their power and the opportunity for them to seize non official economic 
advantages. The idea is also to define the levels at which the official consultations 
need to take place in order to guide the investors or to protect them from an endless 
and multilevel negotiation process;  
• the systematic publication of the minutes to offer absents or the excluded persons 
the possibility to oppose the project; 
• the participation of a third party designated by the civil society or specialists 
(lawyers, land expert, etc.) and funded by civil society or investors (through a 
dedicated fund); 
• the publication of the dates and key steps of the consultations and the promotion 
of their spacing out in time in order to let the information spread and the informal 
debates multiply – between the company and the local actors, between the local 
authorities and the local population and amongst the diverse local groups – on the 
approval of the investment and, in that event, on the requested compensations. Such 
transparency on the consultation process offers the civil society the opportunity to 
better organize itself. This transparency intensifies the risk of political twisting but can 
also further the public debate;  
• information sharing on the economic and social options the local communities 
have as well as the discussion on the actual advantages the investment can bring, in 
order to avoid the local communities agreeing the project due to their lack of 
alternatives and their dazzle in front of numerous promises (Vermeulen & Cotula, 
2010 );  
 
- Make the local people, represented by several entities such as mayors, customary 
authorities but also elected villagers representatives, signatories of the land contract;  
- Consolidate the requirements towards more realistic and fair compensation for the local 
actors and the companies thanks to a debate on: 
• the nature and the value of the compensation. Whatever the size of the investment, 
the local communities or the municipalities can ask for lots of compensation in return for the 
land access. The value of these compensations are hardly ever evaluated on a financial basis 
and compared with the total amount of the investment25. Two points deserve to be discussed: 
o let the local communities choose between compensation or their incorporation as 
shareholders of the company, decision-makers or producers (joint venture, contract farming). 
An inclusive business model can ease a better return on the means available in the investment 
(labor, land, natural resource) and create incentive to make the project work. The limits of 
some business models, inclusive in appearance but exclusive in practice, have to be taken into 
account as the actual competencies of the local communities in piloting a company or 
controlling the profit sharing can be very restricted (see the failure of joint venture in 
Malaysia - Cramb, 2013; or in South Africa - Lahiff et al., 2012); 
o let the communities choose between financial compensation or advantages in 
nature. In other words, do investors have to contribute to a fund or to implement themselves 
the promised services and infrastructures? In both cases, the value of the compensation, from 
the local taxes to the contributions to the local development, should be proportional to the 
                                                 
25
 E.g. in Indonesia (East Java province), the companies must invest 2,5% of their annual profits in CSR actions, 
these latter being deductible of their taxes (TCS, 2013) 
  
17 
 
scale of the investment or the size of the allocated land areas. If investor contributes to a fund, 
this latter could be: a) allocated in coherence with a rule negotiated by the affected people and 
b) socially controlled thanks to regular publications of the bank statements. If investors give 
compensation in nature, their definition – and even their realization – should be supported by 
experts to avoid implementing unsuitable or unusable infrastructures or services; 
 
• harmonization, formalization and specification of requirement which requires 
putting in connection the various documents (respectively the ones linked to the EIA, the land 
lease contract and the local agreements). This means to develop the content of the 
requirements by specifying the operators’ commitment (quality, quantity, deadlines); 
 
• transformation of all requirements’ documents in legally binding agreement 
(Cotula, 2012);   
 
- Reinforce the existing authorities in charge of conflicts resolution and intervene only 
for a better connection of these latter (from local mediation to mayor intervention, to local 
resolution mechanisms to the courts). In others countries, in case of conflict between 
companies and local people, several institutions can act: from village assemblies stipulated by 
law in Tanzania to courts specialized in land issues in Zambia (German et al., 2013). These 
different mechanisms did not often manage to solve the conflict (op. cit.) but their existence 
(and not the creation of new institutions) and their accessibility should be supported; 
 
 - Plan how to enforce the stakeholders’ commitments by: 
• Defining institutions and organizations in charge of monitoring the parties’ 
commitment, their linkages and their source of funding. The control cannot be realized by 
institutions that promote investment (EDBM) or make – official or non official – profits from 
investors’ activities. This control should result from a synergy between State institutions, civil 
society, media and research organizations (such as Observatory); 
• Publishing contract and requirements’ documents. The Land Observatory 
develops, in partnership with several institutions (ILC, CDE, Cirad), the Platform of Land 
based Investments (PLI) to publish on internet the large-scale land investments (name of 
companies, type of land access, state of progress, etc.). This tool, subject to the forthcoming 
Minister in charge of land issues’ approval, should be public in 2014. The data comes from 
the Malagasy land administration and from repeated field surveys realized by the Land 
Observatory. Unfortunately, the requirements’ documents will not be published. The civil 
society and the citizens are key partners to comment, feed and use these data; 
• Informing on land deals and their state of progress. The PLI will serve this 
function as the Land Matrix26 does it at the international level;  
• Training and connecting the diverse entities, local or national, governmental or 
non-governmental, etc., that can participate in controlling and promoting legal empowerment.  
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